Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia has faced a conflict that is no longer overt but has left behind a trail of escalating tensions.
Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia has faced a conflict that is no longer overt but has left behind a trail of escalating tensions. These tensions stem from actions that fall into a “gray zone,” carried out gradually and systematically. This strategy has been used by China as a key instrument in expanding its territorial claims without having to fire a single shot or wage war in the South China Sea. The grey zone has become one of the most decisive dynamics in shaping the new security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.
The
Grey Zone is not just a strategy but a tool used by a country to build
“advantages” without causing escalation that could trigger direct war. In the
context of China, this strategy is useful for forcing other countries to slowly
accept changes to the status quo. This approach is in line with the concept of
coercive diplomacy, which asserts that limited pressure can force other parties
to change their position without military confrontation. China understands that
war is a very costly option from both an economic and military perspective.
Therefore, the use of coast guards, maritime militias, and civilian survey
ships is a far more effective alternative for achieving its strategic
objectives. China’s two main instruments, the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), are the spearheads of
operations below the threshold of war. Both are equipped with weapons such as
large ships, modern radar, and even lasers or water cannons but remain under
the narrative of “law enforcement.”
Since
2013, the presence of CCG and PAFMM ships around the Spratlys and Paracels has
increased, especially after China accelerated the construction of artificial
islands. This is part of a “salami slicing” pattern that narrows the space for
other countries to maneuver through small but gradual steps. In some cases,
these vessels have engaged in dangerous maneuvers against Philippine,
Vietnamese, and Malaysian ships by blocking supply vessels, chasing fishing
boats, and even directing laser beams at other vessels to disrupt their
observations. These actions are designed to be aggressive enough to assert
control but not so provocative as to trigger military intervention from the
United States or other regional allies. From a coercive diplomacy perspective,
China is pursuing a strategy of gradualism, applying steady pressure that
forces smaller countries to reconsider whether resistance is worth the cost.
The Philippines has experienced water cannon incidents many times, but each
incident has only resulted in diplomatic protests rather than a change in the
balance of power on the field.
One
of the most prominent aspects of China’s strategy is its use of legal
narratives. China frames almost every incident as a professional and legitimate
action by its coast guard to protect its national territory. These narratives
are not mere rhetoric but part of China’s three-pronged warfare strategy, which
is public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.
In
the South China Sea, the dispute over these small islands is not merely about
territorial claims; rather, the region is of paramount strategic and economic
importance because more than one-third of global maritime trade passes through
it, making it a vital trade route. Control over this route could increase
China’s economic and geopolitical leverage. Furthermore, the region is rich in
natural resources such as oil and gas reserves, which will certainly help to
fulfill China’s future energy needs. Furthermore, China is also seeking to
expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and position itself as a major
maritime power, thereby reducing the role of the United States. These strategic
needs are the reason why it will be very difficult for China to relax its grey
zone approach, as this strategy is an instrument that can change the status quo
without incurring too great a cost to its reputation.
Looking
at the responses of ASEAN countries, their responses are not entirely the same
even though they are all affected. The Philippines has been the most vocal,
especially since the laser incident involving their patrol boat. Vietnam has
also strengthened its navy, while Malaysia tends to remain silent but
strengthen its closed diplomacy. In this case, China’s strategy works because
the parties under pressure do not have the capacity to respond in a balanced
manner. Most of these ASEAN countries cannot provide punishment deterrence, so
they can only rely on denial deterrence, which strengthens their ability to
defend themselves and reduces the effectiveness of China’s pressure. On the
other hand, the United States is trying to provide security guarantees through
“Freedom of Navigation” operations, but these are more responsive than
preventive. The uncertainty of these small countries means that China does not
want to miss this golden opportunity to expand its sphere of influence.
Then,
legally and militarily, China’s Grey Zone strategy is difficult to counter.
Simply, there is no involvement of weapons in this strategy, and the actions of
the CCG and PAFMM are difficult to categorize as use of force under
international law. Second, coast guards and maritime militias are not included
in the armed forces, which means they operate in a legal gray area. Finally, if
the attacking vessels are fishing boats that have undergone modification, it is
difficult for the targeted country to prove that they are part of a state
operation. Broadly speaking, the more ambiguous China’s actions are, the more
room they have to change the maritime reality without triggering open conflict.
However,
this strategy could inadvertently trigger a major conflict. This can be seen
from the large Chinese coast guard ships that can easily ram other ships,
causing casualties and triggering escalation. The Grey Zone only works as long
as all parties can restrain themselves, but if one party is cornered and loses
control, escalation could very likely occur within hours.
In
this situation, China’s Grey Zone in the South China Sea poses a serious threat
to regional stability. This strategy creates pressure without war but can
significantly change the political and legal reality by exploiting legal
loopholes, power imbalances, and narrative ambiguities. Countries in the region
must build more effective security mechanisms that go beyond military buildup
to include coast guard coordination mechanisms, maritime incident protocols,
enhanced technological capabilities, and more aggressive international legal
diplomacy.
This
argument underscores that without innovation in defense approaches, the region
will continue to be mired in uncertainty, and China’s Grey Zone strategy will
become increasingly effective year after year. Ultimately, regional stability
requires legal clarity, a balance of power, and the ability of countries to
resist pressure that moves silently, rather than relying solely on the absence
of war.
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